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Abstract
If we cannot directly empirically test the claims of a particular scientific theory
directly, then it would be nice to have some other criteria with which to assess its
viability. In his 2013 book, String Theory and the Scientific Method, Richard Dawid
aims to develop such criteria, with an eye to vindicating research programmess in
disciplines where direct empirical data is scant or non-existent. In an accompanying
paper, Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger formalise Dawid’s so-called ‘No Alternatives
Argument’ (NAA) using a generalised Bayesian framework, as a first step towards
formalising Dawid’s entire research programme (which itself relies on two further
arguments). In this paper, I argue that the formalisation of the NAA cannot play the
central role in Dawid’s programme as intended. This is based on the observation that
not all confirmation is non-negligible confirmation. For Dawid’s programme to be
useful, it must demonstrate the viability not just of non-empirical theory confirmation,
but of non-negligible non-empirical theory confirmation. I argue that Dawid et al.’s
appeal to Bayesian confirmation theory to formalise his NAA cannot guarantee non-
negligible confirmation. As a result, I conclude that if Dawid’s overall project is to
succeed, it must do so without the NAA formalised in this way.
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1 Introduction
Depending on whom one asks, String Theory is anything between the biggest scandal
in theoretical physics and its greatest modern achievement. Proponents of the latter
view argue that String Theory is the ultimate unified theory, which potentially provides a
complete description of all phenomena. Opponents argue that, insofar as String Theory
makes no real, testable predictions, any claims to it being the final theory are premature
at best.
This reference to testable predictions brings to focus an important question for the
philosopher of science: how do we choose between rival hypotheses which purport to
describe, predict and explain scientific phenomena? A popularmove involves assigning so-
called ‘evidence-based’ prior probabilities to competing hypotheses and subjecting them
to a Bayesian confirmation algorithm. This does not limit the number of hypotheses that
could account for a particular data set; rather, it provides, in theory at least, a quantitative
way of assessing how well a given hypothesis responds to extant empirical data, or data
from tests of novel experimental predictions made by the theory. After all, in practice, we
never really find ourselves in a situation where we have more than two or three viable
alternative hypotheses, and even then, it is rare that they each account for all observed
data.
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What if there are no novel experimental tests or extant empirical data available for a
particular theory? In a series of publications [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7], Richard Dawid proposes that
we respond to the problem of confirmation in this context in a different way: rather than
assigning evidence-based priors, Dawid suggests we use an alternative set of inputs, which
he calls ‘Limitation to Scientific Underdetermination’ inputs. So far, so good: insofar as it
is a piece of mathematics, Bayes’ Theorem is indifferent to the source of its inputs.
These novel inputs are an important aspect of Dawid’s attempt to develop a more
general account of confirmation that only relies on empirical data insofar as it constrains
theory space—by limiting the number of alternative theories consistent with a given set
of data points. But, Dawid proposes, there are other important ways to limit scientific
underdetermination—in particular, he suggests that we can use the fact that scientists
have not found adequate alternatives to a paticular theory, together with some further
pretheoretic requirements as a stand-in for empirical data. Dawid’s programme, described
in more detail in §2, relies on three mutually-reinforcing arguments, the ‘No Alternatives
Argument’, the ‘Unexpected Explanatory Coherence Argument’ and the ‘Meta-Inductive
Argument’, to provide confirmation to scientific theories like string theory. As a step to-
wards formalising this research programme, Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger introduce a
formalisation of the NAA [7]. In this paper, I aim to demonstrate that the NAA, on its own
cannot generate non-negligible confirmation, so even though it forms an indispensable
part of Dawid’s programme of confirmation, it cannot feature in a programme of non-
negligible confirmation. This paper is not intended as an argument against the viability of
the entire research programme; rather it should be taken to question the centrality of the
NAA to a programme of non-negligible non-empirical confirmation.
The NAA is suceptible to what I will refer to as the gerrymandering objection—that
confirmation cannot be guaranteed to be significant without an artificially chosen set of
priors.1 The requirement of significance of confirmation is exemplified by argument from
a familiar problem: does observing a non-black non-raven confirm the hypothesis that all
ravens are black? [9] Bayesian Confirmation Theory argues, perhaps counter-intuitively,
that it does, but the degree of confirmation in question is so small as to be negligible.
Not all confirmation, then, is non-negligible confirmation.2 For Dawid’s programme to be
successful, itmust demonstratenot only the viability of non-empirical theory confirmation,
but ofnon-negligible3 non-empirical theory confirmation. IfDawid cannotdo this, (and the
argument in this paper against the ability of the NAA to guarantee significant confirmation
gives us reason to doubt the overall viability of his programme) then the project would
present us with nothing more than a mere formal curiosity. It would be a mathematical
1 Logically, this is equivalent to the disjunction of the claims (i) that significant confirmation is impossible
and (ii) significant confirmation is achieved by stipulating a contrived set of priors. This disjunction is reflected
in the structure of §3.
2 The role played by the non-negligibility requirement is discussed in more detail at the end of §3.1.
3 In this paper, I take ‘non-negligible confirmation’ to be synonymous with ‘significant confirmation’.
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residue of the fairly uncontroversial intuition that there are certain theoretical virtues that
a theory ought to have (consistency, for example4). Whatever they may be, it seems wrong
to suggest that a theory can be significantly confirmedmerely in virtue of displaying these
features.
The only way in which the NAA stands a chance of evading the problem of negligible
confirmation is by associating some highly contrived probability density functions to the
priors. Specifying these functions to the level of detail required to establish non-negligible
confirmation makes the project run afoul of the gerrymandering objection, discussed in
detail in §3.2.
Dawid’s programme is intended to be neutral on the theories it tests. It is, however,
useful to have a concrete example in mind of a theory that would benefit from such
a programme. Here, I choose to use Dawid’s primary example, String Theory. The less
physics-inclined reader is free to substitute any other theorywith scant direct experimental
evidence (Dawid, for example, also discusses paleontology in his book). It is important
to distinguish three different claims about string theory that have the potential to get
mixed together. The first claim is immodest: it says that String Theory is the final theory of
everything. The second claim is more modest: it says that String Theory is likely to be a
viable theory of all known interactions up to some high energy scale. The third is that String
Theory is worth doing. Whilst a reading of Dawid’s book as making the first claimmay well
be a viable one,5 in this paper, I interpret the book as a defence of the second claim, that
String Theory is viable theory of all known interaction (in virtue of which it is worth doing).
I begin, in §2 with a brief recapitulation of Dawid’s programme and the mathematics of
non-empirical theory confirmation. In §3, I present and discuss two objections to the use
of the formalised NAA. None of this is intended as an argument either that research in
String Theory is not justified or that Dawid’s programme is untenable across the board; I
merely contend that String Theory research cannot be justified to a non-negligible degree
purely by appeal to a programme centered on the NAA as formalised by Dawid et al.6
4 Although even this is not uncontrovesial; Vickers [13] argues against the notion that consistency is an
important super-empirical virtue.
5 Two observations make it quite plausible that Dawid is making the stronger claim. First, given that half the
book is dedicated to discussions about String Theory as being the final theory, and the impact that it has on the
debate over scientific realism, I think it is not implausible to read Dawid asmaking the stronger claim. Second,
is the following quote from his most recent paper, [6, pp.4-5]: ‘Onemight...consider a more restrained and
therefore possibly less contestable point of view. On that view the crucial question for the working scientist
is simply whether or not it makes sense to work on a given theory... I do not concur that what is at stake in
non-empirical theory assessment can be reduced to the pragmatic issue of deciding upon research strategies...
[I]n the end, a strong commitment to working on a particular theory hinges on the question whether there
exists a good reason for having trust in the theory’s viability.
6 Although the target of the analysis in this paper is Dawid et. al’s formalisation of the NAA, and Dawid’s
accompanying inferences about String Theory confirmation, I should mention that the arguments provided
here also serve as a rebuttal to Eva and Hartmann’s [8] claims that the absence of reasons for a belief can be
seen as reasons against that belief. This is on the grounds that the analysis provided by Eva and Hartmann is,
in all relevant ways, structurally identical to the one provided byDawid et. al [7]. To flesh this claim out inmore
detail, however, would be tangential to the thrust of this paper—I have therefore included this discussion
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2 The Dawid Programme
2.1 Three arguments
Dawid addresses a range of interrelated issues in the philosophy of String Theory, and
the philosophy of science more generally, in String Theory and the Scientific Method. His
programme is centered on using non-empirical criteria to limit the number of viable
empirically adequate theories. To mount a criticism, or even engage in a discussion of all
the important philosophical issues raised by the book would be well beyond the scope of
a short paper like this. I confine myself, therefore, to the core of Dawid’s programme—the
NAA as formalised using (non-empirical) Bayesian confirmation theory. In this section, I
present a summary of Dawid’s programme, based on his book [3], as well as companion
papers [1, 2, 4, 5, 7].
The No Alternatives Argument
Dawid makes the following claim about the three arguments:
...each of the individual strategies of non-empirical confirmation in isolation
does constitute confirmation but cannot be established to be significant. As
we will see, significant confirmation can only be made plausible based on two
or even three arguments of non-empirical confirmation in conjunction. [6]
The centrepiece of Dawid’s programme is the No Alternatives Argument (NAA)—the
other two arguments are intended to shore up our credence in the claim that String Theory
is viable. However, absent a guarantee of significant confirmation from formalisations of
the other two arguments (which, as of the time of writing, are indeed absent), we need a
guarantee that the confirmation provided by the NAA is non-negligible. The NAA forms
the basis of the Bayesian analysis that Dawid uses to claim that String Theory is non-
empirically confirmed. Themathematical details of the construction are presented in §2.2,
where they are scrutinised. In this section, I provide a formal overview of the important
moving parts of the NAA:
P1: Scientists have not yet found an alternative hypothesis toH , which satisfies certain
constraints,7 despite considerable effort having been spent in trying to do so.
as an addendum to this paper. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to Eva and
Hartmann’s paper.
7 Dawid’s a priori constraints on theories fall into three categories—they must be able to account for extant
empirical data (D), theymust provide distinguishable predictions for the outcomes of future experiments (call
this set E), and they must satisfy a set of scientificality constraints C. ‘C specifies what counts as a scientific
theory. Only those theories that meet the scientificality conditions count as possible theories. Scientificality
conditions are themselves volatile to a given degree andmay change in time’ [5, p. 8]. These constraints are
discussed in detail in [3, 5]. In this paper, I assume that these constraints are unproblematically enforceable.
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P2: If scientists have not yet found an alternative toH , then either (i) it is likely that there
are few or no alternatives toH or (ii) it is too difficult for scientists to find alternatives
toH .
P3: It is not too difficult for scientists to find alternatives toH .
P4: If scientists have not yet found an alternative toH , then it is likely that there are few
or no alternatives toH .
P5: If it is likely that there are few or no alternatives toH , then scientists should have a
high degree of trust inH .8
From this, one concludes:
Conclusion: Scientists should have a high degree of trust inH . 9
To formalise this argument, Dawid takes the conclusion to be equivalent to the state-
ment that the propositionT is confirmed if P (T |F ) > P (T ), whereT is the proposition that
H is empirically adequate and F is the proposition that states the observation that, despite
considerable effort having been spent in trying to do so, scientists have not yet found
an alternative a hypothesis to H which satisfies certain constraints. In §3.1, I argue that
this jump is not warranted; a non-negligibility condition needs to be met before the two
statements can be taken to be equivalent.
P1 is taken to be an empirical fact; for the purpose of this paper, I treat it as such.10
Dawid et al.’s analysis in [7] demonstrates that P (T |F ) > P (T ) confirms the inclusive dis-
junction of two propositions: (i) there are few or no alternatives toH and (ii) the problemof
finding alternative theories is too difficult for scientists given cognitive, technological and
other methodological and physical constraints. In order to tip the balance in favour of con-
firmation of the first disjunct, Dawid relies on two further arguments, the meta-inductive
argument (MIA) and the unexpected explanatory coherence argument (UEA), discussed
in more detail below. The result of these arguments is summarised in P3. Granting, for the
sake of argument, the truth of P3, the disjunction in P2 reduces to the proposition P4. The
likelihood of truth of P4 and P5 are undermined by the gerrymandering objection of §3.2.
8 This proceeds via a sub-premise, that the smaller the number of alternatives to a hypothesis, the higher the
probability that the hypothesis is true. Van Basshuysen [11] correctly points out that this premise is not as
innocent as it sounds.
9 The NAA as presented by Dawid does not include reference to a ‘high degree of trust’. However, since the
basis of the argument in this paper is that the NAA (and, indeed all of non-empirical confirmation) is only
useful if it gives us sufficiently good reason to believe in the viability ofH , I include it as a part of the conclusion
of the NAA.
10 A more accurate description would perhaps be that P1 is ameta-empirical piece of data, since it is not
(directly or straightforwardly) predicted by the theory in question.
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The Unexpected Explanatory Coherence Argument
For such theories, the combination of the NAA and the MIA still does not allow us to
conclude that theory space has been constrained significantly, thus confirmingH . Here,
Dawid introduces a third and final argument, the Unexpected Explanatory Coherence
Argument. According to this argument, ifH was developed with a view to accounting for
one particular type of phenomenon, but unexpectedly accounts for other phenomena
outside the intended domain of the hypothesis, then this makes it more likely that the
observation that P (T |F ) > P (T ) is the result of there genuinely being few or no alternatives
toH , rather than that it being too difficult for scientists to find alternatives. Structurally,
it shores up the NAA in the same way as the MIA does. Dawid claims that this is the
‘non-empirical "cousin" of novel confirmation’ [5, p. 15].
TheMeta-Inductive Argument
It is quite difficult to invent predictively successful theories. It is much easier to invent
theories which can account for extant data. However, the history of science showsmultiple
instances of scientists coming up with research programmes which have predictively
successful theories. IfH is the result of research in the context of a programme that has, in
the past, hadmuch predictive empirical success, then this serves as an inductive argument
in favour of other theories in the research programme. This is an induction, therefore, at the
meta-level: it makes the lack of alternatives more likely an explanation of the confirmation
than the suggestion that finding alternatives is too difficult for scientists.
Dawid uses the MIA (combined with the Bayesian analysis on the NAA) to argue for
the explanation that theory space is genuinely limited to no or few alternatives to String
Theory, given that it is part of the same research programme that gave us the now highly
empirically confirmed Standard Model. But even if we were to grant this, there is still the
question of how one ought to use Dawid’s method for hypotheses which do not clearly sit
in the same research programme as previously predictive successful theories.
2.2 Non-empirical Bayesian confirmation
Bayesian confirmation of scientific hypotheses proceeds iteratively as relevant empirical
evidence is accumulated. Assume, in order to incorporate different positions on the scien-
tific realism debate, that all we wish to confirm is the empirical adequacy11, 12 of a scientific
hypothesis. Bayes’ Theorem follows from the definition of conditional probabilities and,
in its simplest form, reads:
11 I refer to one canonical presentation of empirical adequacy from van Fraassen, ‘a theory is empirically
adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things, and events in the world, is true—exactly if it
‘saves the phenomena’ [12, p. 12].
12More recently, Dawid uses the term ‘viability’ in place of empirical adequacy. By ‘viability’, he means, ‘the
agreement of the theory’s predictions will all empirical data that can possibly be collected within a given
regime.’ [6, p. 9]
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P (T |E ) = P (E |T )
P (E ) · P (T ) (1)
When applied to scientific hypotheses, the variables in the above formula can usefully
be given the following interpretation.T is the proposition thatH is empirically adequate. E
is a proposition expressing somepiece of empirical evidence. Given someprior assignment
of a probability of truth of T , Bayesian confirmation theory says that, in light of some
evidence E , the probability that the T is true is given by the formula above. To count
as confirmation,13 it simply needs to be the case that P (T |E ) > P (T ). One assumes that
the evidence represented in E is relevant to the hypothesisH (to use a line fromDawid,
‘[that] E falls into the (broadly construed) intended domain of H [and] E is logically or
probabilistically related toH ’ [7, p. 215]).
In the absence of empirical data, it seems like the Bayesian project is doomed, given
the apparent irrelevance of non-empirical data to a hypothesis. But Dawid argues that the
following two-step procedure might render Bayesian Confirmation Theory appropriate to
the task. Consider the observation that no alternatives toH have been discovered despite a
great deal of effort on the part of the scientific community. Call this proposition F . Although
F is not relevant to the hypothesisH , if one can find a proposition that is relevant, in some
significant sense, toH and, at the same time, predicts the content of F , then it might serve
as a surrogate for empirical data. Dawid proposes that the set of propositions,Yk of the
form ‘There are k alternatives to hypothesisH ’ fits the bill. It is arguably highly plausible
that that set of propositions, for some small value of k , increases the probability of F being
true. That it adequately ‘mediates the connection’ betweenT and F is less obvious.
2.2.1 The formal setup
It is useful to bear in mind the aim of the analysis that follows: to show that we can le-
gitimately conclude that P (T |F ) > P (T ). To that end, we need somemore machinery. We
already have the propositionsYk . To this we add an auxiliary set of variables D j where j
are valued in the natural numbers, representing the ‘difficulty’ associated with finding
alternatives, that has to do with ‘the cleverness of the scientists, or the available com-
putational, experimental and mathematical resources’ [7, p. 218]. While the value of D j
does not directly affect the probability ofH being adequate, it does affect the conditional
probability of (F |Yk ) being true.
With this setup in place, the authors impose the following five constraints on functions
defined on these variables: 14
13 This idiosyncratic use of word ‘confirmation’ is liable to lead to confusion about what is being claimed by
Dawid. ‘Confirmation’, as used in ordinary conversation, is often taken tomean something like ‘establishment
of the truth or correctness of’, while in the Bayesian (and Dawidian) sense, is closer to something like ‘endorse’
or ‘give credence to’, andmerely refers to an increase in the probability of truth (or empirical adequaxcy, or
whatever else is made to stand in for truth) of a hypothesis.
14More recently, Dawid has attempted to incorporate certain non-negligibilty constraints. These are condi-
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(i) that T is independent of F given Y . This captures the intuition that our belief in the
empirical adequacy ofH is not altered by the knowledge that there are k alternatives toH .
(ii) D is independent of Y . The number of alternatives does not depend on the factors
which affect how difficult it is for scientists to find an alternative toH .
(iii) fk j := P (F |Yk, D j ) is non-increasing in k for all j and non-decreasing in j for all k . This
function encodes the constraint that a large number of alternatives increases (or keeps
constant) the likelihood of finding alternatives to H . It also incorporates the constraint
that increasing the difficulty of a problem decreases (or keeps constant) the likelihood of
finding alternatives toH .
(iv) tk := P (T |Yk ) is non-increasing in k . In other words, as the number of alternatives
increases, the probability that the hypothesisH is empirically adequate decreases (or stays
the same).
(v) There is at least one pair of distinct natural numbers, i, k such that yi yk > 0, where
yk = P (Yk ) and fi j > fk j for some j and ti > tk .
2.2.2 Non-negligibility
Making the values ascribed to priors more quantitatively precise is a standard problem in
Bayesian Confirmation Theory, and not one whose resolution is within the scope of this
paper. Luckily, that problem does not need to be solved in order to undermine the power
of the NAA. In what follows, I argue that the manner in which the values of the inputs
are constrained by Dawid’s programmemakes them unsuitable for the task of providing
non-negligible confirmation.
Insofar as Dawid’s Programme requires that hypothesis H is made more likely to be
viable on confrontation with data regarding the lack of alternatives, his programme is
successful. But, as alluded to in the introduction and footnote 2, it runs the risk of achieving
this purely formal notion of confirmation (in the Bayesian sense) in a way that does not
guarantee that scientists ought to have a significantly higher credence in the hypothesisH .
Providing a precise mathematical boundary for what counts as non-negligible is depen-
dent on anumber of factors specific to the problem in question. In the Ravens Paradox case,
tions which, should they be fulfilled by a programme of non-empirical theory assessment, ‘has a plausible
path towards being significant.’ Briefly, the three conditions are [6, p. 17]:
1. The observations... should be about the external world rather than merely about the system of scientists
and their theories.
2. It should be possible to construe an argument of non-empirical confirmation based on ‘soft’ empiri-
cal confirmation of a meta-level hypothesisY by well specified non-empirical evidence F which, in
conjunction with a positive correlation betweenY and the viability ofH , establishes that F confirmsH
3. Non-empirical confirmation should be applicable only to empirically predictive theories.
The idea behind incorporating these conditions is that they ‘resemble empirical confirmation in a number
of crucial respects’ [6, p. 1]. These merely refine the sorts of hypotheses subjected to his programme, rather
than restructuring the entire programme. Insofar as the following criticism is applicable to any hypotheses
subjected to Dawid’s programme, these conditions are of no help to Dawid.
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for example, it is not clear that there is, in fact, a precise lower bound for non-negligibility.
But it is clear that, given the sheer number of events that qualify as tests of the hypothesis
that all ravens are black (equivalently, all non-black things are non-ravens), the level of
confirmation is tiny on any reasonable measure. I contend that the level of confirmation
that Dawid’s programme provides is of the same order of magnitude, and to this, I ascribe
the term ‘negligible’. Providing an exact cut-off for negligibility would require arguments
beyond the scope of this paper, but it should be pointed out that there are, indeed, certain
values that one can ascribe to Dawid’s credence functions that would arguably qualify
as having led to significant confirmation. If, for example, it can be shown that there is a
probability of approximately 1 that there are no alternatives to String Theory, then at least
from the perspective of arguments in this paper, that qualifies as non-negligible confirma-
tion. For the grey area in between, it is incumbent on Dawid to provide a justification for
considering such confirmation significant.
Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger [7] develop a Bayesian model for the NAA which
they intend to form the foundations of a quantitative non-empirical theory confirmation
programme. In §3.1, I show how, under plausible assumptions, this model simply cannot
account for non-negligible confirmation. In other words, even if the Bayesian updating
step warrants an increase in priors for a given hypothesisH , given Dawid’s analysis, the
increase in these priors will not be guaranteed to be significant. On the surface, this
resembles a more general argument against the Bayesian confirmation programme—that
the Bayesian updating step requires for confirmation only relative, rather than absolute
increase in priors, and that there is in general, no knownway tomake quantititavely precise
the procedure of assigning those probabilities. But this criticism leaves open the option
that such a procedure could exist and that we have just not found it as yet. My criticism
is stronger—I argue that for Dawid’s version of Bayesian Confimation, subject to some
plausible restrictions on the behaviour of the relevant probability density functions, such
a procedure either does not exist, or is susceptible to a circularity objection.
3 The objection
In this section, I detail the manner in which Dawid et. al’s programme runs afoul of the
gerrymandering objection by discussing five cases that jointly cover all the possible forms
that the relevant probability functionsmight take. I begin, in §3.1 by describing two cases in
which significant confirmation isunobtainable. I conclude, in§3.2with three cases inwhich
confirmation could be significant, but only at the cost of having highly gerrymandered
priors or probability functions, i.e. falling prey to the gerrymandering objection.
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3.1 Significance
Under all the assumptions presented in the last section, the authors prove that the F can
be treated as a substitute for E , and P (T |F ) > P (T ). The details of the proof are in the ap-
pendix of [7]. The punch line is whatmatters. Having rephrased the Bayesian confirmation
constraint as P (T |F ) − P (T ) > 0, the authors deduce that this is equivalent to the following
requirement, where dj is the probability that the problem of finding alternatives has a
difficulty ofD j :
∞∑
i=1
∞∑
j=1
∞∑
i,k=1
dj yi yk (ti − tk )(fi j − fk j ) > 0 (2)
While the deduction, given the constraints, is unquestionably correct (and this is all the
authors set out to prove), it does not capture the essence of a non-negligible confirmation
of the hypothesisH . Let us split the sum into two components, by separating the sum over
dj . The remaining sum is over the product of three factors, yi , ti and fi j . One immediate
problem with this setup (which is pointed out by Dawid et al. [7, pp. 225-226]) is that this
product being greater than zero could be accounted for by a sufficiently high value of dj .
In other words, this analysis could just as legitimately be interpreted as showing that the
problem of finding alternatives is just too difficult, for the reasons that are encoded in
the definition ofD j . For Dawid et al., this is a problem that they address by appeal to the
MIA. They claim that the past successes of the research programme of particle physics
makes it reasonable to assume that the problem of finding a theory of quantum gravity
with the relevant constraints is not beyond the cognitive and practical resources of the
best physicists. I am suspicious of this move and am inclined to believe that, whether or
not there exists some reason to disregard the possibility of dj dominating the product,
the other terms in the product themselves cannot together be non-negligible.15 However,
it might be argued that there is a connection between dj and yi on the grounds that the
probability of scientists not having enough resources to find alternatives is small. Of course
this rejoinder ultimately depends on how theMIA is formalised and used to strengthen
the connection between dj and yi . Until that project is completed, a discussion of this
argument is premature, hence beyond the scope of this paper.16
The more significant problem becomes clear when we look at the second component
and then determine what it would take for (2) to have a sufficiently high value. Leaving
aside the problem of evaluating dj , it would have to be the case that at least one of the
three factors, yi yk , (ti − tk ) or (fi j − fk j ) dominates the product. For a fixed value of D j , a
high value of (fi j − fk j ) requires either an inequality of the form i  k or that fi j takes a
very specific form. Let us examine why this is the case. The condition that the function is
non-increasing in k is true for all values of k . This means that there cannot be a decrease
in the value of fi j which is not followed by a further non-increase in the function. In order
15 This amounts to granting the truth of P3.
16 I am grateful to Richard Dawid for pointing this out to me.
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for the difference (fi j − fk j ) to have a non-zero value, it must, therefore, decrease in some
interval between i and k (this condition is explicitly put in as a requirement in A5).
Let us now consider the possible forms of the function yk . In order to aid our analysis,
let us impose a further constraint on our functions—that they be convergent.17 In addition,
let them converge to zero for decreasing functions.18 For this function to take a suitably
high value, it must be the case that there exist two values, i and k such that yi and yk are
‘large’. This can be achieved by gerrymandering either our yi function or by choosing values
of i and k in just the right way.
Let us consider the two sets of functions being modelled here. For the purpose of this
argument, one only need consider either ti or fi . Assume that ti has a significantly high
value at some point where we are considering the value of the product. In such a case,
confirmation will still be negligible if the product of yi and fi is negligible. And in the
alternative case, where ti takes a negligibly low value at the relevant point, the product is
doomed to give us negligible confirmation anyway. In other words, of the three functions,
two pairs are such that the product of their functions cannot be significant. So it does not
matter which of the pairs we consider.
Let us consider two extreme cases for the behaviour of fi , and see how the yi functions
respond, if they aremodelled asmonotonically increasing (other forms of yi are considered
in the next section):
17 Their domain is thenatural numbers, so these functions are automatically continuous, because thepreimage
of any open set in the target is an open set in the domain equipped with the discrete topology.
18 This condition has to be met for any function that does not assign a zero value to a finite collection of
domain values in order for the Kolmogorov axioms to be satisfied.
12
3.1 Significance
Case 1—Linear monotonic functions
fi
yi
Consider representing both fi and yi as linear functions with a very mild gradient,
negative for fi and positive for yi .19 In such a case, if i  k , then yi yk becomes negligibly
small, for small values of i . For any nearby values of i and k , the value of fi becomes
negligible. Finally, for larger values of i , the condition that yi be a probability density
function ensures that, beyond a certain finite value, the value of yi either drops to zero or
approaches it asymptotically. This means that, for the proponent of the view that there are
only finitely many alternatives,20 Dawid’s analysis renders the confirmation negligible for
any values of i and k beyond this limit.
19 In both of the following cases, note that, since yi is a probability density function, it will eventually, above a
certain value, have to take on zero value, although it is allowed to do this asymptotically. This feature is not
represented in the graphs.
20 Bear in mind that Dawid’s analysis does not work in the case that there are definitely infinitely many
alternatives.[7, p. 216]
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Case 2—fi decays rapidly, yi increases monotonically
yi
fi
Here, in order that (fi − fk ) be large, we need it to be the case that either i or k is very low,
and this suppresses yi yk . In the region where both i and k are low, there is still a chance
that fi − fk is significant, but this corresponds to a negligible value of yi . If i and k are both
very high, this suppresses (fi − fk ). And if i  k , then either (fi − fk ) is very low (if i and k
are both high) or, as above, yi yk is very low (if i is very low). Once again, given the yi is a
probability distribution, it cannot increase forever, so there will be some value of i beyond
which yi yk will anyway be very small.
There are, of course, variations on these function types available, but the two cases
mrentioned above represent two extremes for the behaviour of the (fi − fk ) function. Given
this restrictionon thebehaviourof that function, if yi is amonotonically increasing function
(up to a certain value of i ), confirmation is doomed to be negligible. The only way around is
to assume that yi is not monotonic (or that it decays exponentially, which is a special case
of case 3, described below.) But such functions fall prey to the gerrymandering objection.
3.2 The Gerrymandering objection
There are some values that the functions take that can plausibly be taken to lead to non-
negligible confirmation (the simplest example would be if yi = 0, ∀i > 0). But the only way
to do this is to impose very stringent restrictions on the form of the probability density
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functions in a way that begs the question against the whole project.
Case 3—fi decays very rapidly, while yi has a sudden spike for a small subset of values
of i
i
yi
fi
This is, formally, the most promising option so far. Here, for a pair of values i, k that
are low, and relatively near one another, two functions could take on values which, when
multiplied, give us non-negligible confirmation. It is at this point, that we need to look at
the plausibility of modelling our functions in this way.
Consider first the yi function. Such a functionmodels the proposition that the probabil-
ity that there are no alternatives to the hypothesisH is zero, but the probability that there
are a few, say three or four, is very high. It goes on to suggest that the probability that there
are more alternatives than three is low. In order for the value of the probability function
to be sufficiently high at low values of i and k , it needs to be the case that the probability
function drops off rapidly after three or four (or whichever value of i to which we attribute
a spike). If not, then any value of yi yk is doomed to be negligibly small. The problem with
imposing this condition is that it begs the question of thewhole project—whatever interval
of the natural numbers corresponds to the spike in our function, it needs to be imposed
pre-theoretically, specifically at a very low value of i . In other words, we cannot use Dawid’s
analysis to conclude that the No Alternatives Argument is valid, unless we have already
assumed that there are no or few alteratives toH . This undermines the premise P2 of §2.
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Case4—fi decaysmonotonically,while yi has two (or,more generally,n sudden spikes
for small subsets of values of i and k that are very far apart
i
yi
fi
This case, a generalisation of case 3, lifts the restriction of (rapid) exponential decay
of fi but imposes a highly unnatural constraint on yi . In effect, we replace the no alterna-
tives assumption with the ‘either very few or some specific other number of alternatives’
assumption. Modelling the yi function in this way is even more egregious than in case
3, because there is no plausible justification for doing so coming from within the theory
(or, for that matter pretheoretically). As in case 3, the second we impose unjustified extra
constraints, we run the risk of begging the question, and undermining the purported
soundness of the NAA.
Dawid’s assertion that P (T |F ) − P (T ) > 0 requires, for non-negligible confirmation,
not only that yi be large, but that fi j and ti j be large too. This feature of the mathematics
undermines P5 of the No Alternatives Argument by blocking the inference from ‘there
are few or no alternatives’ to ‘scientists should have a high degree of trust’. The former
corresponds to yi taking on a high value for some small i , while the latter corresponds to ti
and fi , in addition to yi taking a high value for the same value of i . And the list of plausible
cases presented in this paper demonstrate that this is not possible.
A second strand to the gerrymandering objection concerns the possibility that, al-
though individual terms are negligible, their infinite sum might not be. Call this case
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5.21
For the sake of argument, let us assume that we have stipulated a sharp value, k , such
that if P (T |F ) − P (T ) > k , then confirmation is non-negligible. P (T |F ) − P (T ) is an infinite
sum, so there are three ways in which it can take a value of kor more:
(1) A single term in the summation is greater than or equal to k
(2) No single term is ≥ k, but a finite sum of terms is greater than or equal to k . This
requires a finite number of terms to be non-negligible.
(3) All individual terms are negligible, but the infinite sum is greater than or equal to k .
The first part of the gerrymandering objection explicitly argues against (1) and (2), in
the retstricted context of the values of the functions at specific values of i .
Consider (3). Recall that P (T |F ) − P (T ) is the difference between two infinite sums,
Σ(fi .yi .yk )−Σ(fj .yi .yk ). In order for this to be non-negligible, a necessary (though, obviously
not sufficient) condition is that the first sum be non-negligible. Rewrite the product func-
tion in the bracket of the first sum as, say g (i ), where i is a positive integer. Only a specific
number (which might, indeed, will, be infinite) of functions g (i )will sum non-negligibly.
So non-negligible confirmation will still require a stipulation of a form that the g (i ) takes.
And this, too, is subject to the gerrymandering objection, but now as applied to the form
of the function, independent of the values it may take for a given integer.
The argument against a finite number of terms summing non-negligibly can be sum-
marised more formally in the following way:
P1’. Cases 1, 2, 3, 4 exhaustively characterise the classes of plausible probability (density)
functions.
P2’. Cases 1 and 2 cannot provide non-negligible confirmation (From the ‘significance’
part of the gerrymandering objection)
P3’. Confirmation can be non-negligible only if the functions are of the form presented
in case 3, case 4.
P4’. Cases 3 and 4 apply only if one assumes that the yi takes a certain, very specific form.
(From the gerrymandering objection)
P5’. For case 3, this form amounts to imposing the constraint that it is likely that there
are no (or few) alternatives toH .
P6’. For case 4, this form amounts to imposing the constraint that the yi functions spike
at intervals separated by a large distance.
21 I am grateful to Nick Huggett for drawing my attention to this possibility.
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P7’. Both P5’ and P6’ involve the assumption that it is likely that there are no alternatives,
whileP6’ assumes, in addition, that it is also likely that there is a specific large number
of alternatives.
Conclusion. Confirmation is non-negligible only if one assumes it is likely there are no
(or few) alternatives.
Looking at premiseP5’, related to Case 3, onemight argue that the assumption of no (or
few) alternatives is a sufficient but not necessary assumption to constrain yi in the required
way. Is it not enough, the objection goes, that the function have a spike somewhere, even
if it is not the case that the precise location is pretheoretically determined? This is true,
and, in the absence of constraints (or in the presence of different constraints) on fi , this
would, indeed, be enough. But the stringent restriction on fi , that it be a non-increasing
probability density function restricts the potentially useful yi functions to one of only two
forms, both of which have to assume that it is likely that there are no or few alternatives to
H .
In incorporating this assumption, we are forced to concede that the empirical basis for
the claim P1 (that scientists have not found alternative hypotheses toH despite consid-
erable effort) is irrelevant to the argument which concludes that scientists should have
a high degree of trust inH . The statementYk of the form ‘there are k alternatives toH ’ is
taken to be true, and no longer mediates the link betweenH and F . As a result, the NAA is
only a sound argument under the assumption that there are no or few alternatives, having
lost the meta-empirical link from P1 to P2:
Q1. It is likely that there are few or no alternatives toH
Q2. If it is likely that there are few or no alternatives toH , then scientists should have a
high degree of trust inH .
Conclusion Scientists should have a high degree of trust inH .
In case 4, in order for yi yk to be non-negligible, yi will, in general, have to be non-
negligible (unless yk is very close to 1, which would require some very strong pretheoretic
arguments). If it turns out the case 4 accurately describes our situation, then that, on its
own, undercuts the NAA, because the updated version of premise P2 now ought to read ‘if
scientists have not yet found an alternative toH , then it is likely either that there are few or
no alternatives toH or that there is some specific other number of alternatives toH ’. This
means that P3 will have to be modified to read ‘if it is likely that there are either few or
no alternatives toH or that there is a specific number of alternatives toH , then scientists
should have a high degree of trust inH . At this point, this is no longer a sound argument in
the way the the original NAA purported to be, given the implausibility of the updated P3.
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Ultimately, what these cases go to show is that the requirement of non-negligibility,
however it is framed, relies on the fi j function having a rapidly decaying form, in addition
to which, the yi must peak at a low value of i . Importantly, no assumptions have to be
made about the behaviour of these functions beyond those made by Dawid et al.—in this
paper, I have not proposed a plausible model for either function, and used that to argue
against Dawid. Instead, the ‘significance’ component of the objection blocks any forms
of yi that are not pretheoretically justified, while the gerrymandering component of the
objection blocks the rest.
Before concluding, I would like to discuss a possible response to the analysis presented
in this paper.22 Dawid et al’s explicit intention behind formalising the NAA was to prove
the possibility of non-empirical theory confirmation, but their paper can also be read as a
demonstration of the possibility of non-negligible confirmation. In terms of the formal
setup of this paper, their claim can be seen as an existence claim—there exist appropriate
probability distributions that lead to significant confirmation. So, one might argue, a
hypothesis can, in principle, receive non-negligible confirmation from the realisation that
there are no viable alternatives.
As it stands, this reasoning is valid. Indeed, this is just a rephrasing of P5. However,
it is useful to consider why this is not a good response to the analysis in this paper by
looking at the broader context of the project. Our interest in confirmation stems from,
among other things, a desire to justify our acceptance of a particular theory. Our claims
to having scientific knowledge are traditionally made by reference to some experimental
observation that justifies our acceptance of the scientific theory on the grounds that that
theory predicts that observation.
Limitation to scientific underdeterminationplays a different role to experimental obser-
vation, since no theory predicts the extent to which it limits scientific underdetermination.
Logically, the structures are as follows. For experimental confirmation,
(i)H → E , whereH is a hypothesis and E is some empirical observation,
whereas for non-empircal confirmation
(ii) NAA → H , where NAA is the claim that there are no alternatives toH .
In (i), justification of belief in the empirical adequacy ofH comes from accumulation
of evidence, E , combined with standard Bayesian confirmation analysis. In the case of
(ii), belief in H is supported, but only to the extent that we have arguments supporting
the antecedent ((ii) is the same as P5). Merely stipulating that the antecedent is true will,
by modus ponens, mean that the consequent is also true. But the justification of this
claim is now suspect, because we are, in effect, just stipulating that H is true. It might
turn out that this is correct;H might, by some stroke of luck, happen to be the empirically
22 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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adequate theory we seek. But in this case, the NAA no longer plays the role of justifying
our acceptance of H , rather, it provides a grandiose framework for stating the simple
stipulation that we had already acceptedH to begin with.
4 Conclusion
I have focussed my scepticism about Dawid’s programme of non-empirical theory confir-
mation on the qualitative Bayesian methodology used to argue in favour of non-empirical
confirmation. More precisely, having made a distinction between negligible confirmation
and non-negligible confirmation, I questioned the assumption that the NAA could be
the lynch pin of a non-negligible confirmation programme. The soundness of the NAA
requires that the link between a theory being confirmed and the trust that scientists have
in the theory be robust. It ceases to be sound, either because (i) the significance objection
blocks P3: ‘If it is likely that there are few or no alternatives toH , then scientists should
have a high degree of trust inH ’ or (ii) because the gerrymandering objection means that
the consequent of P2 is merely asserted: ‘If scientists have not yet found an alternative to
H , then it is likely that there are few or no alternatives toH .’
Without the NAA to serve as its cornerstone, Dawid’s programme of non-empirical
theory confirmation must rely on some quantitative, non-negligible confirmation from a
formalisation of one of its other two pillars, theUEAor theMIA. Futureworkwill determine
whether the programmes of formalising those two arguments are successful; either way
the result of this paper is intended to show that formalisation of the NAA, at least in the
form presented by Dawid et al. will not feature in a successful formalisation of Dawid’s
overall programme.
A Addendum
[The following section is a response to a recent paper by Eva and Hartmann [8], which
argues for a thesis by analogy with the NAA. Here, I demonstrate that Eva and Hartmann’s
‘no reasons for is a reason against’-type arguments (NRFs) are importantly disanalogous
to the NAA. In addition, like the NAA, they, too, are subject to the significance problem).]
Here is an example of what seems to be a bad inference: ‘there is no reason to believe
P therefore ¬P ’. In a recent paper, however, Eva and Hartmann [8] attempt to provide a
Bayesian justification of this form of inference in certain contexts. Such inferences, which
Eva andHartmann refer to ‘no reason for is a reason against’ arguments (henceforthNRFs),
typically consist of tokens of the following proposition types:
(1) A hypothesis,H . For example, ‘God exists.’
(2) A proposition, F , of the form ‘I have not yet found a good argument in favour ofH ’
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(3) A propositional variable,Y , whose values are the propositionsYi , of the form ‘there
are exactly i good arguments in favour ofH ’ (where i is some non-negative integer)
An NRF argument then consists of the observation that if F is true, then, under certain
circumstances, that should increase the probability ofYi being true for a small value if i .
Consequently, the probability of the truth of the hypothesis ¬H should rise. I propose that
there is a further desideratum that Eva and Hartmann do not include in their paper: that
in order for NRFs to be epistemically relevant, they ought to establish not only that the
probability of the truth of ¬H rises, but that this rise is non-negligible, in at least some
important contexts. It is to this version of NRFs that the criticism in this paper is directed.
The argument provided by Eva and Hartmann in favour of NRFs is that it is analogous
to the NAA. In this section, I argue that Eva and Hartmann do not vindicate NRFs under
any circumstances because there is a crucial disanalogy between NRFs and the NAA.
A.1 Alternatives and arguments against
For Dawid, the NAA is one of the foundational principles of his larger project of defending
the idea of non-empirical Bayesian confirmation of scientific theories. The project is moti-
vated by a desire to be able to confirm fundamental physical hypotheses, like those made
by string theory, even though we have reached a stage in the development of fundamental
theories in physics where such theories appear not to make predictions which we can
probe directly.
Recall from above, the structure of Dawid’s NAA:
P1: Scientists have not yet found an alternative hypothesis toH , subject to the satisfac-
tion of a set of desirable constraints. This is in spite of a concerted effort of a large
community of professionals for a long time.
P2: If scientists have not yet found an alternative to H (that satisfy those constraints),
then either (i) there are few or no alternatives toH or (ii) there is some practical or
theoretical barrier to scientists finding alternatives toH .
P3: There is no practical or theoretical barrier to finding alternatives toH .
P4: If scientists have not yet found an alternative toH , then it is likely that there are few
or no alternatives toH .
P5: If it is likely that there are few or no alternatives toH , then scientists should have a
high degree of trust inH .
Therefore,
Conclusion: Scientists should have a high degree of trust inH .
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As discussed, Dawid et al.’s proof of the NAA establishes the inclusive disjunction of two
distinct propositions: (i) there are few or no alternatives toH and (ii) there is some practical
or theoretical barrier to scientists finding alternatives toH . The second disjunct is then
dismissed by appeal to themeta-inductive argument (MIA). According to this argument
(in the context of string theory), the past success of particle physicists in coming up with
complex and ultimately satisfactory theories that describe the world to a high level of
accuracy at a particular energy scale, serves as an inductive base for the effectiveness
of the particle physics research programme. String theory, Dawid’s argument claims, is
the natural continuation of that research programme, so past successes of the particle
research programme establish the appropriateness of that research programme to the task
of finding alternative theories. It is therefore the absence of alternatives, rather than the
existence of practical or theoretical barrier to finding alternatives, that accounts for the
fact that P (H |F ) > P (H ).
A.2 The disanalogy
NRFs are arguments aimed at establishing a higher probability of the truth some propo-
sition, call it P , given the absence of arguments to the contrary. If, as Eva and Hartmann
contend, NRFs are structurally analogous to the NAA [8, p. 426], its structure should be of
the following form:
P1’: Philosophers have not found an argument in favour of ¬P .
P2’: If philosophers have not yet found an argument in favour of ¬P , then either (i) there
are few or no such arguments or (ii) there is some practical or theoretical barrier to
finding such arguments.
P3’: There is no practical or theoretical barrier to finding such arguments.
P4’: If philosophers have not yet found an argument in favour of ¬P , then it is likely that
there are few or no arguments for ¬P .
P5’: If it is likely that there are few or no arguments for ¬P , then philosophers should
have a high degree of confidence in P .
Therefore,
Conclusion: Philosophers should have a high degree of confidence in P .
The proof of NRFs alluded to in Eva andHartmann’s paper, by analogy with the proof of
the NAA, establishes that P (P |N ) > P (P ), where N is the proposition that states that no (or
few) arguments for ¬P have been presented. But exactly as with the NAA, the conclusion
of the proof is an inclusive disjunction: either (i) P or (ii) there is a practical or theoretical
barrier to finding arguments for ¬P . The MIA plays an ineliminable role in bolstering
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the NAA’s claims to being significant, by denying the second disjunct in P2. But it is not
obvious that there could ever be an analogue of the MIA that will allow us to discard the
equivalent disjunct, P2’ in an NRF.
What might such an analogue, if it exists, look like? In the case of the NAA (which
is intended to apply to scientific hypotheses in particular), the induction is over claims
associated with scientists who work in the same research programme as the theory under
scrutiny. Importantly, these research programmes usually have reasonably well-defined
sociological or epistemological boundaries that allow us to characterise and group hy-
potheses appropriately. The success of, say, the standard model of particle physics does
not count as evidence on which one performs an induction to increase the probability
of truth of a new theory of genetics.23 But it is far from obvious that any similar group of
theories or hypotheses exists to aid an NRF. What, in other words, is the relevant group of
theories, whose success serves as an inductive base for the probability of the truth of the
metaphysical claim that God exists? The burden is on Eva and Hartmann to provide us
with such a group of hypotheses, absent which, they cannot claim to have established the
utility of NRF arguments.
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